An interesting exploitation of the popular micro-blogging service Twitter has been reported a few hours ago.
A bogus website - TwitterCut.com - has been set up to collect users' login details for Twitter. Once the website receives the login details from Twitter users, it apparently uses these details to authenticate them with Twitter and post messages (tweets) under the credentials of these users.
The message it posts contains the link to TwitterCut.com and reads: "OMG I just got over 1000 followers today from http://twittercut.com". Once this message is posted into Twitter under the credentials of the compromised user, all the followers of that user will automatically receive that tweet.
If the followers click the link contained in the tweet they receive, they'll be redirected to TwitterCut.com where they'll be suggested to enter their own login credentials, which in turn will generate more tweets. With every new user tricked, the tweet is submitted to more and more followers so that it expands exponentially in a similar way to a "chain letter" scam or a typical worm infection.
On top of that, every Twitter user who enters her login details at TwitterCut.com will also be unwillingly redirected into the websites serving adware, thus generating the revenue for the author of this worm with every unique visit. The advertising context can potentially be replaced with the sites serving malware, so it's clearly a security issue.
The scheme of this scam is illustrated below:
The replication seem to have started from a Twitter user JordanEmbry. The same person appear to have registered TwitterCut.com. Twitter has deactivated JordanEmbry account, but Google cache still reveals the profile and some recent tweets.
The biography field reads: "--!*FOLLOW ME*!-- as soon as I reach 20,000 followers Im opening a site you will love!". The profile shows that JordanEmbry had 250 Twitter users who have agreed to become the followers - all of them must have received the first-generation tweet to start up its replication.
Once these followers have received the first tweet and followed the bogus website to enter their details, their own followers should have received the same tweet, then the followers of the followers, and so on.
TwitterCut.com hosts a small script that traces the visits to the website. At this time of writing the online statistics shows that during the 4 days it exists TwitterCut.com has already attracted over 13,000 visits in the last 2 days.
If you did receive the scam tweet in your personal Twitter profile, it means that someone from the Twitter users who you follow has been tricked into entering the login details at TwitterCut.com. All these users can be seen by finding the scam tweet that was posted under their credentials.
The affected users are advised to change their Twitter account password immediately. Otherwise, the collected credentials can potentially be used many times again to send more impersonated tweets with the links to websites with more dangerous contents.
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
Thursday, May 7, 2009
Pwned UxV
Peter Singer, a leading US defense analyst, who headed Barack Obama's defense policy team during last year's presidential campaign, believes that the world is on the brink of a "robotics revolution" in military combat that will have profound social, psychological, political and ethical effects.
The US had invaded Iraq in 2003 with just over a handful of unmanned aerial drones, and no unmanned ground vehicles, he said. Today it used more than 7,000 drones in the air, and more than 12,000 unmanned ground vehicles capable of combat.
Their use in warfare was a massive development in human history, he told the Lowy Institute in Sydney, via videolink from Washington.
The use of robots in the war zone is not spontaneous – it is in fact mandated by the US Public Law 106-398 which sets a goal of one-third of all ground combat vehicles to be unmanned by 2015.
Last year, the first transformer-like armed robot MAARS (Modular Advanced Armed Robotic System) was set to be deployed to fire in combat:
"It can be changed from one mission setup to another in short order," says Charles Dean, the Foster-Miller company's senior program manager for advanced robots. Operators can alter the machine's treads, drive system, weaponry and even its dimensions.
"Government has been working with us over the last 18 months to develop and provide an innovative and evolutionary approach to combat situations that address the battlefield of the future," said Dr. William Ribich, President of the Technology Solutions Group, QinetiQ North America.
Security Aspects
Let's have a look at the software architecture that drives MAARS robot.
Built by Applied Perception, part of the QinetiQ North America Technology Solutions Group, the software called Soldier Universal Robot Controller (SURC) enables operators to simultaneously task, monitor, and teleoperate multiple unmanned robots from a single control station.
Its User Interface can apparently be integrated into a handheld control unit, or as user application running on a notebook, e.g. under Ubuntu Linux, as seen on the image below:
SURC system consists of several elements that are depicted in the following scheme:
Its core modules are responsible for keeping track of the robots, path and mission planning, and storing data about the existing objects.
An interesting aspect of this architecture is that SURC plugs into JAUS (spelled as "jaws"), Joint Architecture for Unmanned Ground Systems. SURC's transport component is responsible for interfacing SURC with JAUS.
JAUS is an open message-passing architecture that unifies multiple computing nodes and provides the means of their inter-communication. It defines the hierarchy structure of the elements (subsystems, nodes, components), defines the standard for the message that is passed from one component to another, and defines other requirements such as mission isolation, platform, hardware, and operator use independence (just like the Web).
JAUS dictates the use of UDP (User Datagram Protocol) as a communications protocol between the nodes. The messages are packed into JAUS message structure and are handled with the node managers according to the commands specified in these messages. The traffic is forwarded via the port 3794, the "JAUS Robots" port.
As any other software architecture, it will very likely be a matter of time until JAUS is probed for an unauthorized access. The rule of thumb here is the bigger the target and its importance, the more lucrative it is and thus, the larger incentive and motivation will be there to exploit it. It won't be a question of "how", it will be a question of "when".
Let's try to imagine for a moment in science fiction terms what attack vectors against JAUS are possible, and what an unauthorized access to it could result in.
In theory, an interception of traffic between the transport component of SURC and the JAUS platform that connects it with the in-field robots' node managers, can be exploited.
Firstly, a UDP flood attack may render the whole fleet of robots useless.
Secondly, an injection of malcrafted packets into the link between SURC and JAUS may potentially change the mission goals, starting from the civil casualties increase, and finishing with hijacking the whole fleet of UxV and then re-recruiting it against the original command centre. This could potentially be exploitable due to the platform, hardware, and operator use independence declared by JAUS open architecture standard.
Thirdly, JAUS architecture could also potentially be attacked with the malformed exploits transmitted via port 3794, either with the purpose of gaining full administrative control over the node managers or simply causing denial-of-service by crashing their software.
Of course, these attacks are very unrealistic right now. So the reader should consider these insinuations a pure fantasy. But if the reader thinks for a moment of how many platforms were supposed to be secure by design, but could still easily be exploited; if the velocity of the progress and the scale of attractiveness for the attackers are all accounted, then it might be easier to imagine how in a few years time all robotic machines would have to be patched every Tuesday:
The US had invaded Iraq in 2003 with just over a handful of unmanned aerial drones, and no unmanned ground vehicles, he said. Today it used more than 7,000 drones in the air, and more than 12,000 unmanned ground vehicles capable of combat.
Their use in warfare was a massive development in human history, he told the Lowy Institute in Sydney, via videolink from Washington.
The use of robots in the war zone is not spontaneous – it is in fact mandated by the US Public Law 106-398 which sets a goal of one-third of all ground combat vehicles to be unmanned by 2015.
Last year, the first transformer-like armed robot MAARS (Modular Advanced Armed Robotic System) was set to be deployed to fire in combat:
"It can be changed from one mission setup to another in short order," says Charles Dean, the Foster-Miller company's senior program manager for advanced robots. Operators can alter the machine's treads, drive system, weaponry and even its dimensions.
"Government has been working with us over the last 18 months to develop and provide an innovative and evolutionary approach to combat situations that address the battlefield of the future," said Dr. William Ribich, President of the Technology Solutions Group, QinetiQ North America.
Security Aspects
Let's have a look at the software architecture that drives MAARS robot.
Built by Applied Perception, part of the QinetiQ North America Technology Solutions Group, the software called Soldier Universal Robot Controller (SURC) enables operators to simultaneously task, monitor, and teleoperate multiple unmanned robots from a single control station.
Its User Interface can apparently be integrated into a handheld control unit, or as user application running on a notebook, e.g. under Ubuntu Linux, as seen on the image below:
SURC system consists of several elements that are depicted in the following scheme:
Its core modules are responsible for keeping track of the robots, path and mission planning, and storing data about the existing objects.
An interesting aspect of this architecture is that SURC plugs into JAUS (spelled as "jaws"), Joint Architecture for Unmanned Ground Systems. SURC's transport component is responsible for interfacing SURC with JAUS.
JAUS is an open message-passing architecture that unifies multiple computing nodes and provides the means of their inter-communication. It defines the hierarchy structure of the elements (subsystems, nodes, components), defines the standard for the message that is passed from one component to another, and defines other requirements such as mission isolation, platform, hardware, and operator use independence (just like the Web).
JAUS dictates the use of UDP (User Datagram Protocol) as a communications protocol between the nodes. The messages are packed into JAUS message structure and are handled with the node managers according to the commands specified in these messages. The traffic is forwarded via the port 3794, the "JAUS Robots" port.
As any other software architecture, it will very likely be a matter of time until JAUS is probed for an unauthorized access. The rule of thumb here is the bigger the target and its importance, the more lucrative it is and thus, the larger incentive and motivation will be there to exploit it. It won't be a question of "how", it will be a question of "when".
Let's try to imagine for a moment in science fiction terms what attack vectors against JAUS are possible, and what an unauthorized access to it could result in.
In theory, an interception of traffic between the transport component of SURC and the JAUS platform that connects it with the in-field robots' node managers, can be exploited.
Firstly, a UDP flood attack may render the whole fleet of robots useless.
Secondly, an injection of malcrafted packets into the link between SURC and JAUS may potentially change the mission goals, starting from the civil casualties increase, and finishing with hijacking the whole fleet of UxV and then re-recruiting it against the original command centre. This could potentially be exploitable due to the platform, hardware, and operator use independence declared by JAUS open architecture standard.
Thirdly, JAUS architecture could also potentially be attacked with the malformed exploits transmitted via port 3794, either with the purpose of gaining full administrative control over the node managers or simply causing denial-of-service by crashing their software.
Of course, these attacks are very unrealistic right now. So the reader should consider these insinuations a pure fantasy. But if the reader thinks for a moment of how many platforms were supposed to be secure by design, but could still easily be exploited; if the velocity of the progress and the scale of attractiveness for the attackers are all accounted, then it might be easier to imagine how in a few years time all robotic machines would have to be patched every Tuesday: